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Abstract
For several years, scholars have (for good reason) been 
largely preoccupied with worries about the use of artificial 
intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) tools to make 
decisions about us. Only recently has significant attention 
turned to a potentially more alarming problem: the use of 
AI/ML to influence our decision-making. The contexts in 
which we make decisions—what behavioral economists call 
our choice architectures—are increasingly technologically-
laden. Which is to say: algorithms increasingly determine, 
in a wide variety of contexts, both the sets of options we 
choose from and the way those options are framed. Moreover, 
artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) makes 
it possible for those options and their framings—the choice 
architectures—to be tailored to the individual chooser. They 
are constructed based on information collected about our in-
dividual preferences, interests, aspirations, and vulnerabili-
ties, with the goal of influencing our decisions. At the same 
time, because we are habituated to these technologies we pay 
them little notice. They are, as philosophers of technology put 
it, transparent to us—effectively invisible. I argue that this in-
visible layer of technological mediation, which structures and 
influences our decision-making, renders us deeply suscepti-
ble to manipulation. Absent a guarantee that these technolo-
gies are not being used to manipulate and exploit, individuals 
will have little reason to trust them.
1. Introduction
For several years, scholars have (for good reason) been 
largely preoccupied with worries about the use of artificial 
intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) systems to make 
decisions about us. The algorithms mediating much of our 
lives are impenetrable black boxes (Pasquale 2015) that per-
petuate discrimination (Barocas and Selbst 2014), evade ac-
countability, and deprive us of due process (Citron 2008; 
Crawford and Schultz 2014). Institutional decision-making 
processes once guided by flawed and oftentimes biased hu-
man decision-makers are now being replaced by automated 
systems that learn from and reproduce those flaws and bi-
ases, and, indeed, accelerate their negative effects (O’Neill 
2016). In response, these scholars have called for increased 
fairness, accountability, and transparency (”FAT*”) around
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algorithmic decision-making, and have begun to develop
technical and policy frameworks for achieving it.1
This work, which takes what I call a structural approach
to AI/ML ethics, is deeply important. But it only tells part
of the story. In this paper, I take a more individual approach,
describing a set of problems that flows from the introduction
of AI/ML systems into peoples everyday lives. Specifically,
instead of attending to the ways algorithms are used to make
decisions about us, I focus here on the use of AI/ML systems
to influence our decision-making.2 Information technolo-
gies increasingly mediate our decision-making processes in
a wide range of contexts, from consumer decisions to polit-
ical ones. And such technologies—driven, more and more,
by AI/ML tools—are not neutral arbiters of such choices.
Rather, these “adaptive choice architectures,” as I call them,
work to subtly guide us toward certain ends (Esposti 2014;
Yeung 2017; Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum 2018).
What’s more, given the way we tend to interact with and
experience technology, these influences are largely hidden.
As philosophers of technology and science & technology
studies (STS) scholars argue, once we become adept at using
technologies they become “transparent” to us. Here, trans-
parent is meant not in the sense in which it is often used
in policy contexts (i.e., as insight into otherwise obscure
practices), but rather more literally: once we are habituated
to technologies we stop looking at them and instead look
through them to the information and activities we use them
to facilitate (Ihde 1990; Verbeek 2005; Van Den Eede 2010).
For the sake of clarity, I will refer to transparency understood
in this way as “invisibility.” The problems I describe in what
follows stem from the fact that we do not consciously attend
to—we dont see—many of the technologies now mediating
our day-to-day lives. They are, for practical purposes, invis-
ible.
This invisible layer of technological mediation, which
structures and influences our decision-making, renders us
radically susceptible to manipulation. At an individual level,
it threatens our autonomy, and at a collective level, it
1See, for example, http://www.fatml.org/resources/relevant-
scholarship
2Of course, many of the problems I discuss in what follows
have structural causes. By “individual approach” I mean only that
the object of my analysis in this paper is the effects of a certain
class of AI/ML tools on individual experience.
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stands to undermine social values, like democracy, which
are premised on individuals being capable of independent
decision-making. Given the risks these technologies pose,
and the relative powerlessness of those affected to challenge
them, I argue (1) that designers of AI/ML-driven systems
sometimes ought to sacrifice the seamlessness and invisibil-
ity they usually strive for in the construction of user expe-
riences, for seamful, visible interventions that promote user
awareness and autonomy; (2) that the firms and other orga-
nizations designing and deploying adaptive choice architec-
tures ought to provide radical transparency about both the
means and the ends of the systems they create; and (3) the
design and management of algorithmic influence ought to
be governed by a strict duty of care. Absent a guarantee that
these technologies are not being used to manipulate and ex-
ploit, individuals will have little reason to trust them.
2. Adaptive Choice Architectures
In their 2008 book Nudge, Richard Thaler (a behavioral
economist) and Cass Sunstein (a legal theorist) put forward
the now well-known idea that the contexts in which we
make decisions inexorably shape the decisions we reach.
At bottom, the reason for this is that we do not, for the
most part, give our decisions a great deal of conscious, re-
flective thought. Rather, as the psychologists Daniel Kahne-
man and Amos Tversky argue, we make most decisions very
quickly, using fairly unreliable cognitive shortcuts or heuris-
tics (Kahneman 2011). We lean on examples that come
quickly to mind, even if they are not representative (Thaler
and Sunstein 2008, 25). We assume that if our friends are
doing something then perhaps we ought to do it too (Ibid,
53-60). This means that we rely heavily on contextual cues
when making everyday decisions, often without realizing it.
The way in which our choices are situated and framed—
the options we have and how they are described, who offers
them to us, in what way, and when—all help determine the
decisions we eventually make. Thaler and Sunstein call these
decision-making contexts choice architectures.
Given this basic fact about human deciders, the question
for Thaler and Sunstein is: why not design specific choice
architectures to incline people toward individually and so-
cially optimal outcomes? If contexts make such a big differ-
ence, why not design them with intention and for good? One
of their famous examples of how to do this—how to “nudge”
people into making better decisions—describes how food
items are arranged in a cafeteria. People are more inclined,
they suggest, to choose whichever options are situated at
eye-level than they are to select something arranged above or
below it (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 1-2). Again, for Thaler
and Sunstein, this mainly raises a question about policy—
shouldn’t we arrange cafeteria food items in a way that in-
clines most people to select the healthiest option? Here, I
want to raise a different question: what if the cafeteria were
arranged differently for every person who walked in the
door?
While that would be difficult to pull off in a physical cafe-
teria, in digital environments it is commonplace. The web-
sites we visit and apps we use are dynamic; unlike Thaler
and Sunstein’s cafeteria, the options they present to us and
the way those options are framed constantly change, pro-
ducing different choice architectures for each user, and for
the same user in different instances. To some extent, this has
been true for web-based technologies since the late 1990s,
when the notion of “adaptive user interfaces” first appeared
(e.g., Langley 1997; 1999). What has changed in the inter-
vening period is the amount of information available about
each of us and the emergence of tools capable of analyzing it
(Esposti 2014). Today, as Karen Yeung argues, we are con-
fronted with “highly personalised choice environment[s]”—
digitally-mediated user experiences structured to match our
particular cognitive idiosyncrasies (2017, 122). As a result,
we are increasingly subject to more than the gentle nudges
Thaler and Sunstein recommend. Vast amounts of data about
both individuals and groups, combined with digital plat-
forms that can dynamically alter the way they present in-
formation to maximally impact each user means we are to-
day subject to something much more powerful—what Ye-
ung terms “hypernudges” (2017). Because our choice archi-
tectures are increasingly adaptive, our choice-making is in-
creasingly susceptible to outside influence.
These developments arrive at the same time as our lives
become generally more technologically-laden. Increasingly,
we decide what to buy by browsing retail websites like Ama-
zon. We decide where to eat by asking recommender ser-
vices like Yelp. We turn to Monster.com to find a job and
Tindr or OkCupid to find a date. Which is to say: the number
of decisions we face in unmediated, purely physical settings
is shrinking. Algorithms determine more and more, in a wide
variety of contexts, both the sets of options we choose from
and the way those options are framed. In and of itself, this
is not a bad thing. The problem is that these adaptive choice
architectures are largely hidden from view.
3. Mediating Technologies as Invisible
Infrastructure
We like to think of technology as something we use—
devices or tools we engage with focus and attention. Our
language reflects this: we talk about technology “users” and
“end-users,” “user interfaces,” and “human-computer inter-
action.” As philosophers, psychologists, and media theorists
have shown, however, this picture of how we relate to tech-
nology is partial at best (see Van Den Eede 2010). In most
cases, once we become sufficiently adept at using technolo-
gies we stop focusing on the technologies themselves and
direct our attention instead to the things we are able to do
through them. For example, we rarely think consciously
about the material features of our smartphone screens or
computer monitors; rather, we attend to the texts, images,
videos, and other information they offer up to us. This is
often referred to as technological transparency, pointing to
the fact that we generally experience the world through tech-
nology, rather than experiencing technology itself, directly
(Ihde 1990; Rosenberger and Verbeek 2015; Susser 2017).
This notion of technological transparency should not be
confused with the ways “transparency” is discussed in policy
contexts. For instance, transparency is often used to describe
institutional openness. Transparency as institutional open-
ness means giving individuals insight into how otherwise
obscure organizational processes work. It is transparency as
institutional openness that people have in mind when they
refer to the old quip that “sunlight is the best disinfectant”
(Brandeis 1914). There is also talk of transparency in dis-
cussions about algorithms. Algorithmic transparency is anal-
ogous to institutional transparency and means offering in-
sight into how automated systems reach the decisions they
do (Pasquale 2015). Elsewhere, Kiel Brennan-Marquez and
I refer to this kind of transparency as “a view-under-the-
hood” (2016).
Philosophers of technology (especially phenomenologists
and postphenomenologists) use the notion of transparency in
a more literal way. They argue that once we become adept at
using technologies, the technologies themselves recede from
conscious attention and perception. This allows us to focus
on what we can accomplish using the tools, rather than fo-
cusing on the tools themselves. Technologies become trans-
parent in the sense that users see right through them. To take
the most famous example, the early 20th Century German
philosopher Martin Heidegger described the experience of
using a hammer. When we hammer things, he pointed out,
we do not attend to the hammer itself. Rather, we attend to
the thing we are hammering (say, a nail). It is only when
the technology breaks down—when it fails to drive the nail
in—that we are prompted to examine the tool itself in order
to diagnose the problem (Heidegger 1962).
Don Norman brought this insight into the realm of tech-
nology design when he argued that digital technologies
ought to be “invisible” to users (Norman 1999). “Tools
should be noticed only when they break,” he writes in The
Invisible Computer (1999, 243). For the sake of clarity, and
following Norman’s convention, I will refer to this notion
of technological transparency as “invisibility.” As Yoni Van
Den Eede has shown, this idea—that when technologies
work they form an invisible layer of mediation between hu-
man users and the world—has been raised time and again
by technology scholars in a range of fields. In addition to
Norman, media theorist Marshall McLuhan (2003), sociolo-
gist Bruno Latour (1992), social psychologist Sherry Turkle
(1995; 2005), and philosophers like Don Ihde (1990) and
Peter-Paul Verbeek (2005) have all pointed, in one way or
another, to the fact that technologies become invisible to the
people who use them (Van Den Eede 2010).
As Norman argues, from the perspective of user experi-
ence this invisibility is all to the good. People use technolo-
gies to accomplish their goals. What is important to users
is not the technologies themselves, but rather the activities
they are using the technologies for. Well-functioning tools
get out of the way and let us focus on the things we have
taken up the tools to do. “Technology is our friend when it is
inconspicuous, working smoothly and invisibly in the back-
ground, like a proper infrastructure should,” Norman writes,
“Technology is a pest when it is in the way, when it is intru-
sive” (1999, 115). Indeed, as Robert Rosenberger points out,
digital technologies need not even break down or fail com-
pletely to irritate us—when websites simply load too slowly
we experience a “drop in transparency,” forcing us out of the
flow of our work and directing our attention to the computer
or smartphone itself, and to the rest of the technological ap-
paratus that might be responsible for the problem, like the
modem, router, and so on (2009).
The fact that we have incorporated information technolo-
gies into nearly all aspects of our lives means that for many
people this invisible infrastructure—this layer of technologi-
cal mediation that facilitates and supports all of the meaning-
ful activities we engage in—is now pervasive. In 2016, the
marketing research firm Nielsen Company estimated that the
average American spends nearly 11 hours per day looking
at screens (including smartphones, computers, televisions,
etc.) (Howard 2016). Given that we also spend, on average,
nearly 7 hours per day sleeping, this suggests that many peo-
ple spend almost twice as many of their waking hours engag-
ing with screens than not (Jones 2013). And not all digital
technologies have screens. We also interface with a wide va-
riety of “smart” objects—tools that have been outfitted with
sensors and computer processors and connected to the inter-
net. Recent (conservative) estimates suggest that there are
already at least 6 billion such devices deployed around the
world, and perhaps as many as 17 billion (Nordrum 2016).
The so-called ”Internet of Things” (IoT) (i..e, the totality
of all those sensor-laden and internet-connected devices)
promises to make the invisible infrastructure of information
technologies we experience the world through even bigger,
more pervasive, and—given that these devices are often de-
signed precisely to operate in the background—less visible.3
Again, from the perspective of user experience, this per-
vasive, invisible layer of digital mediation promises to im-
prove things. Norman is surely right that most of us care lit-
tle about the devices we use, in and of themselves. What we
care about are the people they connect us with, the work they
help us carry out, the entertainment they provide, and the
conveniences they offer. There are, however, issues beyond
user experience. As we’ve seen, the technologies mediating
our everyday lives shape our choice architectures. They en-
able “hypernudging”—dynamically altering the contexts in
which we make decisions in order to influence their out-
comes. The invisible infrastructure of digital mediation is
a platform for manipulation.
4. Online Manipulation
To manipulate someone is to impose a hidden influence on
their decision-making process (Susser, Roessler, and Nis-
senbaum 2018). The fact that our lives are increasingly me-
diated by a hidden infrastructure of technologies designed
to influence the way we choose, suggests, then, that we have
rendered ourselves deeply susceptible to online manipula-
tion. Tal Zarsky has warned about this for some time. De-
tailing the ways advertisers can use information collected
about us to craft highly influential ads, he writes that “the
3The technologies that comprise our invisible technological in-
frastructure are not all digital either. All of the physical and me-
chanical and analogue technologies we engage with follow the
same general patterns. Though a relevant and important conse-
quence of IoT technology is that the boundary between the digital
and non-digital is beginning to blur. That being said, my focus in
this paper is information technology.
use of personal information to provide tailored, manipula-
tive content should be considered a detrimental outcome of
today’s enhanced flow of personal information” (2006, 221).
Similarly, Ryan Calo describes a wide range of manipula-
tive online practices that commercial firms use to induce
customers to buy their products, and at the highest possible
prices (2014).
Consider the case of mobile health (or “mHealth”) apps—
smartphone applications that work in tandem with fitness
tracking devices, like Fitbits or Apple Watches, to con-
tinuously (or semi-continuously) gather information about
users’ physical activity, physiological metrics (heart rate,
etc.), and sleep patterns, and offer suggestions for how
to lose weight, sleep better, or generally improve physical
health and well-being. As Sax et al. (2018) point out, many
(if not most) mHealth apps attempt to influence more than
people’s health; they nudge users to buy health-related com-
modities and services. Using the highly specific information
gathered about individual users from their fitness trackers,
these apps create choice contexts designed to exert maximal
influence. For example, when the Garmin Connect app de-
tects that a user has taken fewer than average steps one day,
it presents a graph showing the decrease alongside sugges-
tions for “10 Healthy Work Habits,” one of which is a na-
tive advertisement (i.e., an advertisement disguised as non-
sponsored content) for a $40 sleep program. In cases such
as this, Sax et al. write, “users do not know that they are be-
ing targeted with personalized content that intentionally ob-
fuscates commercial intent by embedding it in health con-
tent” (107). And the Garmin Connect app is only the be-
ginning: as fitness trackers and the apps that come bundled
with them become increasingly sophisticated, they will en-
able the construction of increasingly adaptive choice archi-
tectures, which deliver increasingly effective ads (Sax et al.
2018; Lanzing 2018).
It would be a mistake, though, to see the problem of invis-
ible influence as limited to the commercial sphere. After all,
it is not only consumer decision-making that is mediated by
adaptive choice architectures. The so-called “gig economy”
or “sharing economy” has introduced algorithmic mediation
into the domain of labor relations (Rosenblat 2018). Martin
et. al. (2013) explore the algorithmic tools Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk system uses to structure the work of its crowd-
sourced laborers. And taking the ride-hailing app Uber as a
case study, sociologists Alex Rosenblat and Luke Stark de-
scribe the myriad ways Uber’s app “algorithmically man-
ages” (i.e., influences the decision-making of) its drivers—
from customer ratings to data visualizations to notification
nudges (2016). Drawing on this work, Calo and Rosenblat
(2017) describe a particularly devious strategy:
while Uber originally showed drivers precise surge
premiums in a given area in association with heat
maps that display varying levels of surge through color
schemes–yellow means demand is rising, orange means
surge may appear soon, and red means it is surging–it
changed the design of its app in October 2015 to show
heat maps with those color schemes but without precise
prices. In effect, the app encourages drivers to believe
in surge and travel to receive surge rides, but it fails
to provide a precise indicator or a guarantee of what
that price is. Heat maps thus function as a behavioral
engagement tool but can effectively operate as a bait-
and-switch mechanism similar to the use of phantom
cars to entice ride-hailers (1662).
In other words, Uber habituated its drivers to one choice
architecture, and then changed it in a way that leverages the
old habits to influence drivers to behave as Uber wants.
Since 2016 the public has also become all too aware that
our political life too is mediated by algorithms. Whereas
worries about the effects of social media on the politi-
cal system were once limited to questions about “filter
bubbles” (Pariser 2012), “media manipulation”4 and voter
microtargeting are now foremost concerns. Data analyt-
ics firm Cambridge Analytica reportedly used information
collected about hundreds of thousands of Facebook users,
combined with aggregate data purchased from third-party
data collectors, to create “personality profiles” on voters in
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Kenya, and elsewhere around the world. According to a
Cambridge Analytica whistleblower, those profiles allowed
the company to deliver highly personalized political adver-
tisements designed to influence voters by exploiting their
“inner demons.”5 To whatever extent these tactics were ef-
fective it was surely due in part to social media’s pervasive
presence as a digital communications infrastructure running
through the public sphere.
These examples of how adaptive choice architectures can
invisibly influence decision-making across social contexts—
from consumer contexts, to the workplace, to the political
sphere—gives an indication of their ability to harm (Susser,
Roessler, and Nissenbaum 2018). At an individual level, ma-
nipulation obviously threatens one’s autonomy. To act au-
tonomously is to act independently, motivated by one’s own
reasons. As Joseph Raz puts it, “the ideal of personal auton-
omy is that people should make their own lives” (1986, 369).
Invisible influence threatens this ideal by inducing people to
act for reasons they don’t understand, and therefore can’t
endorse. Just as clear, however, are the collective harms. Im-
portant social values, like democracy, are premised on the
notion that the individuals taking part in the institutions they
govern are themselves independent, autonomous, deciders.
Diminishing the capacity of individuals to make meaning-
fully independent decisions in the political sphere under-
mines their ability to recognize political institutions as their
own.
5. The Ethics of Invisibility
“If you could imagine any one obtaining this power
of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or
touching what was another’s, he would be thought by
the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although
they would praise him to one another’s faces, and keep
4https://datasociety.net/research/media-manipulation/
5https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/cambridge-
analytica-facebook-scandal-180327172353667.html
up appearances with one another from a fear that they
too might suffer injustice.” (Glaucon to Socrates in
Plato’s Republic, Book II)
So, what is to be done? In what remains, I briefly describe
three normative implications of the preceding discussion.
First, the functionally invisible, adaptive choice architec-
tures that mediate much of our experience render individ-
uals radically vulnerable to the whims of others. More and
more, as the Garmin, Uber, and Cambridge Analytica ex-
amples described in the previous section illustrate, the digi-
tal infrastructure that supports our everyday activities is de-
signed to influence the directions those activities take—from
using information about our sleep and exercise patterns to
sell us weight loss plans to leveraging our subtle personal-
ity types to influence our votes. Such manipulative practices
substitute the preferences and interests of the choice archi-
tects for the preferences and interests of choosers. Although
they don’t coerce people into behaving the way advertisers,
employers, or political campaigns would have them act, they
nonetheless undermine people’s capacity to decide for them-
selves. The harms that flow from these hidden influences
are twofold: at bottom, the fundamental harm, as discussed
above, is that manipulation subverts autonomy—the individ-
ual’s capacity to act on the basis of reasons they themselves
recognize and endorse. Furthermore, because autonomous
individuals usually act in their own interest, the subversion
of autonomy often leads to a second harm: diminished wel-
fare. When our capacity to advocate for our own interests
is compromised, we should not expect our interests to be
served.
The second implication—correlative with the first—is
that the creators of adaptive choice architectures wield an
enormous amount of power, which carries with it spe-
cial ethical responsibilities. In general, those who make
decisions for others—e.g., parents, guardians ad litem, or
fiduciaries—are understood as being duty-bound to make
decisions in the interests of their charges. In fact, this is a
special case of a broader principle pertaining to the rela-
tionship between vulnerability and responsibility. As Robert
Goodin writes, “If A’s interests are vulnerable to B’s ac-
tions and choices, B has a special responsibility to protect
A’s interests” (1985, 118). Philosophically deep, this notion
is also utterly commonsensical: when someone’s fate is in
your hands, you ought to try to do right by them. T. H. Green
states this idea even more directly: “There is no clearer ordi-
nance of that supreme reason, often dark to us, which gov-
erns the course of man’s affairs, than that no body of men
should [...] be able to strengthen itself at the cost of others’
weakness” (1881).6 In the context of adaptive choice archi-
tectures, the meaning of Green’s observation is plain: it is
wrong—and obviously so—to use the tools of invisible in-
fluence to induce people to act against their own interests.7
6Quoted in Goodin (1985, 37).
7Arguably, it is also wrong to invisibly influence someone to act
to further their own interests. Which is to say, due to its autonomy
harms manipulation might always be wrong, even if it results in
increased welfare. I leave that question to the side here. Goodin’s
account of the relationship between vulnerability and responsibility
To do so is an abuse of power.
Third, despite the simple and obvious ethical imperatives
just described, and given that the creators of adaptive choice
architectures and the users who confront them often have
competing interests, there is little reason to trust that these
ethical responsibilities will be met and systems will be de-
signed to the ultimate benefit of users, unless they are gov-
erned by stringent controls. This is true for several reasons.
As the quote from Plato’s Republic, above, reminds us, the
feeling of impunity carries with it a temptation that is dif-
ficult to resist. Moreover, the relationship between choice
architect and chooser is not as straightforward as I have let
on—modern algorithmic systems are rarely the product of
one person’s or even a few people’s work. The apps and dig-
ital platforms described above are produced by huge teams
of designers, project managers, programmers, quality assur-
ance teams, and so on. As a result, there may be no single
person who feels responsible for their effects. This is the
so-called ”problem of many hands” (Nissenbaum 1996). To
be clear: the fact that there is no single choice architect—
but rather sprawling teams of them—does not, morally, ab-
solve those teams of responsibility. But as a practical matter
it might mean that moral concerns are not always salient to
the people building the tools.
So, again, the question is: what is to be done? I don’t pre-
tend to have a complete answer. While the problem of ma-
nipulation is, one must assume, as old as we are, the problem
of adaptive choice architectures—of an invisible infrastruc-
ture of technological mediation constantly collecting infor-
mation about us and using that information to shape and in-
fluence our choices—is something new, and it will take a
great deal more work to reckon fully with its consequences.
As a modest start, several things follow from my argu-
ment thus far. First, with respect to technology design, if
the problem is, at bottom, hidden or invisible influence, then
sometimes we need the invisible infrastructure of techno-
logical mediation to reveal itself. Since, as I argued in sec-
tion 3, invisibility (or “technological transparency”) is good
for user experience, this means occasionally compromising
user experience in the name of user welfare and autonomy.
When creating adaptive systems, designers ought to consider
how the value of a seamless user experience—the system it-
self receding from view—trades off against the user’s ability
to understand how the system is influencing them. In some
cases, seamlessness ought to be abandoned in favor of what
Chalmers and Galani (2004) call “seamfulness,” or what I
have called “strategic opacity” (Susser 2017)—revealing to
the user precisely what is going on beneath the surface.
But seamful user experiences will not be enough. Thus,
second, in addition to requiring thoughtful, autonomy-
promoting design decisions, adaptive choice architectures
demand radical transparency on the part of the firms cre-
ating and deploying them. Here I mean transparency in the
policy sense—we need a view under the hood. Those filling
our everyday decision-making environments with adaptive
understands vulnerabilities in entirely welfarist terms. For a discus-
sion about these issues that understands vulnerability more broadly,
see the introduction to Mackenzie et al. (2014).
choice architectures must be entirely forthcoming, not only
about the fact that they are using such tools, but about their
purpose (intended outcomes), and about the mechanisms by
which they achieve it.
Finally, because the designers of these systems are highly
incentivized to subvert user interests, and because the invis-
ible nature of invisible influence renders it exceedingly dif-
ficult to detect, demands for radical transparency and seam-
ful design must be accompanied by stringent accountability
measures. Creators of adaptive systems ought to be held to
the highest standard of care—they should be required, that
is, to create systems that beyond any doubt advance users’
interests. Even then difficult questions would likely remain
open, about the harms to autonomy that could accompany
even the most beneficently manipulative systems. In tandem
with radical transparency, though, and with user interface
designs that promote user awareness and autonomy, it would
represent a meaningful start.
6. Conclusion
My aim in this paper has been to shine light on a set of
concerns stemming from advancements in artificial intelli-
gence and machine learning—namely, concerns that adap-
tive choice architectures (using information collected about
individuals to shape their decision-making contexts) facili-
tate online manipulation. In contrast with worries about how
intelligent systems are used to make decisions about us,
the issues I described stem from the use of AI/ML to in-
fluence our decision-making, raising fundamental questions
about the integrity of user autonomy. To meet these ethi-
cal challenges, we must demand radical transparency from
the creators of adaptive systems, encourage seamful user
experiences that enable perceptive and deliberative human-
computer interaction, and we must hold choice architects to
the highest standard of care.
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